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Standard protocols for quantum key distribution (QKD) require that the sender be able to trans-
mit in two or more mutually unbiased bases. Here, we analyze the extent to which the performance of
QKD is degraded by diffraction effects that become relevant for long propagation distances and lim-
ited sizes of apertures. In such a scenario, different states experience different amounts of diffraction,
leading to state-dependent loss and phase acquisition, causing an increased error rate and security
loophole at the receiver. To solve this problem, we propose a pre-compensation protocol based on
pre-shaping the transverse structure of quantum states. We demonstrate, both theoretically and ex-
perimentally, that when performing QKD over a link with known, symbol-dependent loss and phase
shift, the performance of QKD will be better if we intentionally increase the loss of certain symbols
to make the loss and phase shift of all states same. Our results show that the pre-compensated
protocol can significantly reduce the error rate induced by state-dependent diffraction and thereby
improve the secure key rate of QKD systems without sacrificing the security.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd
INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is considered to
be one of the most promising and practical applica-
tions of quantum information science [1–3]. It has been
studied both theoretically and experimentally since it
was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [4]. In
early works, researchers focused mainly on 2-dimensional
quantum systems, for example, the polarization states of
individual photons [5]. For the past decade, effort has
been dedicated to the investigation of higher-dimensional
quantum systems [6–8]. The benefits of utilizing higher-
dimensional quantum systems for QKD include higher
information capacity and enhanced robustness against
eavesdropping.
Orbital angular momentum (OAM) states are attrac-
tive candidates for QKD because they intrinsically span
an infinitely large Hilbert space. Beams with an az-
imuthal phase dependence exp(iℓθ) carry an OAM of ℓh¯
per photon, where ℓ is the integer OAM quantum num-
ber. After the breakthrough work by Allen et al. in 1992
[9], the properties and applications of OAM have been
studied in both classical and quantum regimes [10–14].
One characteristic of an OAM state is its ℓ-dependent
diffraction [15]. Because of the state-dependent diffrac-
tion (SDD), OAM states with higher ℓ will have larger
far-field sizes, and acquire more propagation phase (i.e.
the Gouy phase of Laguerre Gaussian (LG) states).
Thus, in practical free-space communication links, dif-
ferent OAM states will suffer different amounts of loss
for a given collection aperture of finite size [16, 17], lead-
ing to ℓ-dependent detection efficiency. Similar problems
occur for states in the complementary angular (ANG)
basis, which consist of an equal superposition of OAM
states with fixed relative phase between adjacent OAM
states [7, 18]. Due to the SDD, both the amplitude of
each OAM state and the relative phase will be modified.
Therefore, the received state will be different from the
transmitted state, increasing the error rate at the receiver
even in the absence of eavesdropper. The adverse effects
of SDD in both OAM and ANG bases result in QKD sys-
tems less robust against background noise, measurement
errors and eavesdropping. Although OAM-based QKD
systems have been demonstrated in both laboratory and
outdoor environments [7, 8, 19], the influence of SDD on
QKD systems has not yet been adequately addressed in
previous work [20].
Here, we investigate the performance of a d-
dimensional QKD system under SDD using OAM states
as the example. The SDD results in an efficiency mis-
match in OAM basis and an increased error rate in ANG
basis, which results in a lower secure key rate. These
SDD-induced defects are quantitatively studied as a func-
tion of the Fresnel product Nf in vacuum, which is de-
fined as Nf = (π/4)DADB/(λz) [21]. DA and DB are
the diameters of the circular transmitting and receiving
apertures respectively, λ is the wavelength of the light,
and z is the propagation distance. We then propose a
pre-compensation protocol to minimize the defects. To
validate the approach, we experimentally measure the
crosstalk matrices for both the pre-compensated proto-
2col and the original protocol, and then estimate the se-
cure key rates in both cases. We find that for a quantum
channel with a small Fresnel number product Nf but
high-dimensional encoding space, the pre-compensated
protocol can significantly reduce the error rate and pro-
vide a greater secure key rate per transmitted photon.
SECURITY LOOPHOLE INDUCED BY
STATE-DEPENDENT DIFFRACTION
Because of the finite sizes of transmitter and receiver
apertures, higher-order OAM states, which have stronger
diffraction, will experience greater loss and acquire more
propagation phase. To determine the channel transmis-
sion efficiency of a specific OAM state, we define a prop-
agation operator Fˆ that transfers the OAM eigenstate
prepared by Alice |ℓ〉A to the state received by Bob |ℓ〉B
(which is also an OAM eigenstate but has a different ra-
dial amplitude distribution) as:
|ℓ〉B = Fˆ |ℓ〉A. (1)
The operator Fˆ includes the effects of propagation in vac-
uum and the finite apertures at both transmitter and re-
ceiver sides. Note that Fˆ only results in different amounts
of loss, but does not introduce any crosstalk between
different OAM |ℓ〉 states. Therefore, this is not a uni-
tary transformation, and if we define the efficiency εℓ as
εℓ = 〈ℓ|ℓ〉B/〈ℓ|ℓ〉A, we obtain the following eigenvalue
relation [21]:
Hˆ |ℓ〉A = εℓ|ℓ〉A, (2)
where Hˆ = Fˆ †Fˆ and εℓ is the corresponding efficiency of
|ℓ〉A (See Supplementary material for details).
In OAM-based QKD, the complementary ANG basis
is the Fourier conjugate of the OAM basis. The ANG
state of index j is defined as [7, 18]:
|j〉 = 1√
d
L∑
ℓ=−L
|ℓ〉e−i2πjℓ/d, (3)
where d is the dimension of the Hilbert space and L is
the maximum OAM quantum number in use, which sat-
isfies the relation: 2L + 1 = d. The ANG basis and
OAM basis form two mutually unbiased bases (MUBs),
and the use of two or more sets of MUBs guarantees the
unconditional security of QKD [22, 23].
In practice, as we mentioned above, different OAM
states will suffer different amounts of diffraction, as do
the OAM components of an ANG state. As shown in
Fig.1 (a), for low Fresnel number product (Nf < 1),
there are huge efficiency differences between lower-order
and higher-order OAM states. This difference results in
a nonuniform probability of detecting the OAM states.
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FIG. 1. (a). State transmission efficiency of different OAM
states in a d = 7 quantum system. (b) the QSER at Bob as
a function of Fresnel number product Nf . d is the dimension
of the Hilbert space. The solid lines show the QSER due to
the effects of SDD. The dashed line show the maximum value
of the QSER for which a secure channel can be obtained in
the limit where the effects from SDD are negligible (Nf ≫ 1).
When the QSER goes above the upper bounds, the commu-
nication system is not secure and the secure data rate goes to
zero.
The ANG basis for Bob will thus be modified as:
|j〉B = 1√
εj
Fˆ |j〉A =
d−1∑
p=0
√
Pj,p|j + p〉A
=
L∑
ℓ=−L
√
Pℓ|ℓ〉Ae−iℓ(2πj/d−ψ(z)),
(4)
where 1/
√
εj is the normalization constant given by
εj =
∑d
ℓ εℓ/d, which describes the transmission efficiency
of ANG states. The state |j〉A is the ANG state j pre-
pared by Alice, which has the same form as Eq.(3). The
state |j〉B is the ANG state received by Bob after being
modified by SDD. The quantity Pj,p characterizes the
3crosstalk between ANG states, and is equal to the prob-
ability of finding the ANG state |j+p〉 prepared by Alice
in the ANG state |j〉B received by Bob which has been
modified by SDD. The quantity Pℓ is the probability of
finding the OAM component |ℓ〉 in the modified ANG
state |j〉B. The quantities
√
Pj,p and
√
Pℓ/d are related
by a discrete Fourier transform, and one can also show
that Pj,p is independent of j (see Supplementary material
for details). The propagation phase ψ(z) is the phase ac-
quired by each OAM state after propagating a distance z.
One can notice that the state-dependent loss gives rise to
a nonuniform probability distribution of the OAM spec-
trum, while the state-dependent phase terms introduce
extra relative phase between the different OAM compo-
nents of each ANG state. Both of these effects lead to the
crosstalk in ANG basis, which will be further exacerbated
in current methods for sorting ANG states [24].
One direct consequence of the increased crosstalk is
an increase in the quantum symbol error rate (QSER)
at Bob’s side. Here we define the QSER as the prob-
ability of detecting a photon in a state other than the
launched state [25]: QB = 1− (FOAM +FANG)/2, where
FOAM and FANG are the fidelities of the OAM basis and
ANG basis respectively, defined as FOAM = | 〈ℓ|ℓ〉A B|2
and FANG = | 〈j|j〉A B|2. In our case, assuming there
is no eavesdropping, FOAM equals unity while FANG
equals Pj , which means that only the ANG basis suf-
fers an increased QSER [26]. To quantitatively show how
the QSER changes with diffraction, we have numerically
calculated the probability distribution of Pℓ for Fresnel
number product Nf ranging from 0.01 to 5 under differ-
ent quantum space dimensions in Fig. 1(a). When Nf is
close to 0, only the fundamental Gaussian state (the ℓ = 0
state) can be transmitted. Therefore, the OAM spectrum
at Bob will be very narrow, and the ANG spectrum will
become uniform, leading to a complete loss of informa-
tion. As Nf increases, all OAM states will have equal
efficiency near 1, indicating that state-dependent loss is
negligible. The QSER as a function of Nf is shown in
Fig.1 (b). For a given dimension d, small Nf can signif-
icantly increase the QSER even if there is no quantum
attack. This will lead to a lower information capacity
(see Supplementary material for details), and make the
system more vulnerable to eavesdropping and quantum
cloning since the upper bound for the QSER is fixed for
each given dimension d [27, 28]. Moreover, for a given
Nf , a higher dimensional system will suffer from more
crosstalk introduced by SDD. For instance, in Fig.1 (b),
the crosstalk for d = 11 is three times larger than the
crosstalk for d = 7 in a Nf = 2 system. In addition
to the loss of information, higher error rate means that
one needs to sacrifice a greater fraction of the raw key to
detect the existence of eavesdroppers, because the legit-
imate parties cannot distinguish the errors generated by
eavesdroppers’ attack from other errors in the system.
The nonuniform efficiencies induced by SDD in the
OAM basis introduces a detection efficiency mismatch
in Bob’s detectors, which can be utilized by Eve to con-
trol information received by Bob. The security of QKD
in the presence of efficiency mismatch has been both
theoretically and experimentally studied [29–31]. Fortu-
nately, measurement-device-independent QKD protocols
have been developed to eliminate the loopholes from side-
channels including efficiency mismatch [32–34], and one
can implement these protocols to remove this SDD in-
duced security loophole. However, these strategies can-
not eliminate the effect of SDD (the increased QSER)
in the ANG basis. Therefore, a new protocol that can
reduce the effect of SDD in both bases needs to be de-
veloped.
WAIST PRE-COMPENSATION PROTOCOL
From the discussion above, one can conclude that, the
non-uniform efficiency induced by SDD leads to a secu-
rity loophole in the OAM basis due to state-dependent
loss, and an increased error rate in the ANG basis caused
by both state-dependent loss and phase. Therefore, to
reduce the adverse effects of SDD, a uniform efficiency
for all encoding states is desirable, which requires ad-
justing the efficiencies of low-order states to match the
high-order states.
Here, we propose a new pre-compensation protocol to
mitigate these adverse effects. Alice first selects one set
of states that she is going to use for encoding, and mea-
sures the efficiency of the state |ℓmax〉A, where |ℓmax〉 is
the largest OAM quantum number to be used. To adjust
the efficiencies of all low-order states to match the effi-
ciency of |ℓmax〉A, she can change the beam radius of each
low-order state so that each state has a same divergence
angle αℓ: αℓ ∝ (|ℓ| + 1)/rrms(0), where rrms(0) is the
root-mean-square (rms) beam radius defined by Ref.[15].
That is to say, Alice intentionally increases the loss of the
low-order states to reduce the state-dependent loss. We
call this set of OAM states uniform-energy-loss (UEL)
states. Alice then uses these specially prepared OAM
states to construct the corresponding ANG basis j. Af-
ter this, a uniform efficiency has been achieved for both
OAM and ANG states, and both the efficiency mismatch
and the increased QSER for Bob can be significantly re-
duced. Since the two bases are orthogonal and mutually
unbiased throughout the entire propagation distance, the
security analysis of this protocol is identical to the one
for the BB84 protocol but with a higher uniform channel
loss. We name the approach we have just described waist
pre-compensation (WPC).
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FIG. 2. (a): The experimental setup. L1 to L5 are lenses
while SLM denotes the spatial light modulator. A1-A4 are
apertures, and BE is beam expander. Z1 represents the prop-
agation distance from transmitter aperture A2 to the receiver
aperture A3. (b): the measured probability distribution with
no pre-compensation. (c): the experimental result of WPC
protocol. We can see that the diagonal elements in figure (c),
which represents the fidelity of the states, have less error than
in figure (b). The worst fidelity in figure (b) is less than 70%
while the average fidelity is only 85.8%. As the comparison,
the worst fidelity in figure (c) is 86.8% and the average fidelity
is 93.3%. Therefore, the crosstalk in figure (c) is less than the
crosstalk in figure (b).
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To implement our protocol in a laboratory setting,
we measure the crosstalk matrix for a Fresnel number
product Nf = 3.96 and dimension d = 7. A HeNe laser is
coupled into a single-mode fiber (SMF) to generate a sin-
gle spatial mode at 633 nm. The first spatial light mod-
ulator (SLM1), together with lenses 2 (L2, focal length
0.75 m) and 3 (L3, focal length 0.5 m), are used to gener-
ate the desired input states |ℓ〉A and |j〉A [18]. Aperture
1 (A1) is used to select the first diffraction order. The
distance (Z1 = 3.12 m) between transmitter’s aperture
(the diameter of A2 is 3.07 mm) and receiver’s aperture
(the diameter of A3 is 3.25 mm) constitute the link with
Fresnel number product Nf = 3.96. Both A2 and A3 are
implemented by round apertures written onto SLM1 and
SLM2 respectively. The second SLM scans the OAM and
ANG spectra, and projects the desired state onto the fun-
damental Gaussian state, which can be coupled into the
second SMF. The details of the projective measurement
are included in the Supplement. A power meter (PM) is
used to measure the transmitted intensity at the end.
To quantitatively show the benefits of the WPC pro-
tocol, we measure the conditional probability of finding
each state received by Bob for each state transmitted by
Alice, and display the results in a crosstalk matrix (Fig.
2 (c)). One can see that the crosstalk in the ANG ba-
sis is very small, in particular when compared with the
crosstalk of no compensation protocol, which is shown
in Fig. 2 (b). The average QSER measured in the case
of no compensation is 14.2% while the average QSER
with WPC is 6.7%. The mutual information with WPC
protocol equals to 2.56 bits per photon, an improvement
over 2.22 bits per photon in the case of no compensation.
From the QSER above, we can then find the secure key
density using the following equation based on two MUBs
protocols [28, 35]:
r = log2 d+ 2[Q log2
Q
d− 1 + (1−Q) log2(1−Q)], (5)
where Q represents QSER at Bob’s side. The secure key
density r is then found to be 1.76 bits per photon with
WPC protocol, a significant improvement from 0.89 bits
per photon in the no compensation case.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Although the WPC protocol will ensure the robust-
ness of the quantum system and provide a higher in-
formation encoded per photon, it will lower the over-
all efficiency and may result in a lower secure key rate
because of a lower average transmission probability [7].
However, for practical quantum encoding systems with
higher dimensionality and lower Fresnel number prod-
ucts, the crosstalk introduced by SDD can be much larger
than in the ideal case. In such circumstances, the exter-
nal errors from either modal dispersion (from turbulence,
optical fiber, etc.) or imperfect mode sorting can be se-
vere, which makes it even more necessary to implement
the pre-compensation protocol for a better QKD perfor-
mance.
The simulated comparison of the secure key rate per
transmitted photon between WPC protocol and no com-
pensation protocol with different error rates from exter-
nal errors are shown in Fig. 3 as a function of Fresnel
number product Nf . When Nf is small, we see that
WPC protocol can significantly improve the performance
of high-dimensional QKD systems in realistic links, espe-
cially in the presence of external errors. Even for our
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FIG. 3. (a) and (b): Simulated secure key rate per trans-
mitted photon as a function of Fresnel product Nf with 0%
and 10% external errors respectively. The solid lines repre-
sent the secure key rate using WPC protocol while the dashed
lines represent the secure key rate with no compensation.
in-laboratory measurements, which have low external er-
rors, the secure key rate is increased from 0.86 to 1.63
bits per transmitted photon when WPC is implemented
(see Supplementary material for details). Therefore, in
realistic QKD systems, intentionally sacrificing some ef-
ficiency for low-order states to get a lower but uniform
efficiency can significantly benefit the system.
Another concern regarding the WPC protocol is how
practical it will be in a realistic QKD scenario. As we
discussed above, in most cases, the WPC protocol is su-
perior to no compensation protocols only when Nf is
limited. In realistic scenarios, most current free space
QKD systems have Fresnel number products less than
1, especially the satellite-to-ground system (Nf = 0.23)
[36, 37]. Thus the WPC protocol could be useful in opti-
mizing the performance of future global high-dimensional
QKD systems. Furthermore, implementing WPC proto-
col is simple: one only needs to take the Nf of the system
into consideration, and employ the optimal set of beam
waists, which requires no extra apparatus.
We assumed OAM encoding and circular apertures in
the discussion given above. However, SDD is expected to
be a problem for any type of spatial-mode encoding, and
for a given system, we can always find a set of eigenstates
with uniform transmission efficiency. Therefore, our new
protocol is generic for realistic high dimensional quantum
encoding scenarios utilizing spatial degrees of freedom
[38–40].
In summary, we have analyzed the performance of a
high-dimensional QKD system based on OAM encoding
in the presence of SDD. In practical free-space quantum
links with finite aperture sizes and long transmission dis-
tance, SDD can introduce a high error rate and security
loopholes, which can significantly reduce the information
capacity of the quantum link and its robustness against
quantum attacks. To overcome this threat, we propose
the use of WPC based on the use of UEL states, which
have a uniform loss for all encoding states. We imple-
mented this approach experimentally and showed that
it can appreciably reduce the QSER and improve the
secure key rate per transmitted photon. Since the two
bases in the WPC protocol are orthogonal and mutu-
ally unbiased, the security of this new approach is the
same as the conventional BB84 protocol. Therefore, by
intentionally increasing the loss for certain states to get
a uniform efficiency, we can significantly reduce the ad-
verse effects induced by SDD, and improve the secure key
rate in QKD systems. Considering that in the near fu-
ture, high-dimensional QKD systems will be a promising
platform for increasing the channel information capacity
of free-space communication systems, our WPC protocol
will aid in improving the performance of these systems,
and increase their robustness to eavesdropping.
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7Derivation of the eigenvalue Eq.(2) in the main
paper
We employ the same notation as in the main paper.
The |ℓ〉A represents the state prepared by Alice while |ℓ〉B
denotes the state received by Bob. The propagation oper-
ator Fˆ includes both the effects of diffraction and limited
aperture size at the receiver. That is, this operator is not
unitary and includes the loss of the link. Therefore, if we
define the power sent out by Alice as PA = 〈ℓ|ℓ〉A A and
the power received by Bob as PB = 〈ℓ|ℓ〉B B, we can write
the efficiency εℓ = PB/PA = 〈ℓ|ℓ〉B/〈ℓ|ℓ〉A. We can then
rewrite this equation in the following form:
〈ℓ|ℓ〉B B = 〈ℓ|Fˆ †Fˆ |ℓ〉A A
= 〈ℓ|εℓ|ℓ〉A A.
(6)
If we define a new operator Hˆ = Fˆ †Fˆ , we can get the
following relation:
PB = 〈ℓ|Hˆ |ℓ〉A A. (7)
Therefore, to find the optimal field maximizing the ef-
ficiency, we need to maximize the PB for a given PA.
Then, we use a Lagrange multiplier by introducing an
additional scalar variable εℓ, and rewrite this optimiza-
tion problem as:
P˜ = 〈ℓ|Hˆ |ℓ〉A A − εℓ[ 〈ℓ|ℓ〉A A − PA]. (8)
By differentiating P˜ with respect to 〈ℓ|A , we have:
∂P˜
∂ 〈ℓ|A
= Hˆ|ℓ〉A − εℓ|ℓ〉A. (9)
By optimizing the P˜ , the Eqn. (4) should be 0. There-
fore, we have the following eigenfunction:
Hˆ |ℓ〉A = εℓ|ℓ〉A. (10)
Hence, the resulting eigenvalue εℓ is the efficiency of the
eigenstate |ℓ〉A which maximizes the transmission effi-
ciency of a given link.
Calculation of mutual information IAB in the
absence of eavesdropper
First we prove that the
√
Pj,p and
√
Pℓ/d are related
by a quantum Fourier transform, and Pj,p is independent
of ANG state index j. From Eq.(4) in the main paper,
we can find the following inner products:
〈j + p|j〉A B =
√
Pj,p
= 〈j + p|A
L∑
ℓ=−L
√
Pℓ|ℓ〉Ae−iℓ(2πj/d−ψ(z)).
(11)
Therefore, we can find the following relation:
√
Pj,p =
L∑
m=−L
√
1
d
〈m|A ei2π(j+p)m/d
×
L∑
ℓ=−L
√
Pℓ|ℓ〉Ae−iℓ(2πj/d−ψ(z))
=
L∑
ℓ=−L
√
Pℓ
d
ei2π(j+p)ℓ/de−i2πjℓ/deiℓψ(z)
=
L∑
ℓ=−L
√
Pℓ
d
eiℓ2π(p/d+
ψ(z)
2pi ).
(12)
Therefore we can find the Pj,p is independent of j and
equals the Fourier transform of
√
Pℓ/d.
We then show how to get the Eq.(5) in the paper. The
probability of Alice sending out each symbol is still equal,
but due to the state-dependent loss, the probabilities of
finding each symbol at Bob’s side are different. There-
fore, as what we discussed in our paper, for the photons
which are registered by both parties, we have the follow-
ing probabilities:
P (OAMℓ,B) = Pℓ,
P (ANGj,B) = 1/d,
P (OAMℓ,A) = Pℓ,
P (ANGj,A) = 1/d.
(13)
P (OAMℓ,B represents the probability that Bob receives
a photon in |ℓ〉 state, while P (OAMℓ,A) = Pℓ represents
the probability that Alice sends out a photon in |ℓ〉 state.
This is because those events that Alice sends out one
symbol but Bob receives nothing have been discarded.
The definition of mutual information is:
IAB =
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈B
p(a, b) log2
p(a, b)
p(a)p(b)
, (14)
where p(a, b) is the joint probability. The relation be-
tween joint probability and conditional probability is:
p(a, b) = p(a)p(b|a). In our case, even if Alice is send-
ing out each symbol with equal probability, the photon
statistics at Bob’s side are not uniformly distributed be-
cause of the state-dependent loss. Therefore, we have the
following probability relations:
p(ℓA, iB) = Pℓδiℓ, p(jA, kB) = Pj,p/d. (15)
Therefore, considering Alice randomly chooses her ba-
sis, the mutual information between Alice and Bob IAB
equals:
IAB =
1
2
IAB,OAM +
1
2
IAB,ANG, (16)
where IAB,OAM represents the mutual information us-
ing OAM basis while IAB,ANG is the mutual information
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FIG. 4. (a): The mutual information between Alice and Bob
as a function of Nf . The solid lines represent the mutual infor-
mation with SDD while the dashed lines indicate the mutual
information log
2
(d) in the limit where SDD can be ignored
(Nf ≫ 1).
using ANG basis. The final form of IAB can be found as:
IAB =
1
2
∑
p
Pj,p log2 Pj,pd−
1
2d
∑
ℓ
log2 Pℓ. (17)
As shown in Fig. 4, it is not difficult to verify that IAB
is smaller than the ideal value log2 d. When Nf is near
zero, the information encoded is almost lost, while in the
high Nf region, the information capacity gets close to
the ideal value. Another interesting result is that the
information carried by the two bases is not equal, and
that the information encoded in the OAM basis is always
larger than that carried in the ANG basis because of the
absence of crosstalk in the OAM basis.
Simulation results of WPC protocol
Fig. 5 shows simulation results comparing the WPC
protocol and transmission without the use of compensa-
tion, which we will refer to as the no-compensation pro-
tocol. The Fig. 5 (a) shows the simulated intensity and
phase distributions of the ANG state |j = 0〉 prepared by
Alice in the no-compensation and WPC protocols, while
the Fig. 5 (b) shows the corresponding results for the
received ANG state |j = 0〉. One can notice that both
the intensity and phase profiles for the two protocols are
very different at Alice’s and Bob’s sides. Diffraction dis-
torts the intensity distribution of the received state in
the no-compensation case; after propagating through the
link, the one single main lobe on Alice’s side, which in-
dicates the angular position and the value of j, becomes
two main lobes on Bob’s side. In contrast, the inten-
sity profile in the WPC case remains similar even after
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FIG. 5. (a) and (b): Simulation results of transmitted and
received |j = 0〉 states respectively, both with WPC and
without compensation. (c) and (d): probability distributions
of finding each OAM component in the received ANG state
|j = 0〉, in the no-compensation protocol (c) and WPC pro-
tocol (d). The simulated link has a Fresnel number product
equal to 3.96.
9diffraction. The simulated crosstalk matrices of no com-
pensation protocol and WPC protocol are shown in Fig.
5 (c) and (d), respectively. It is obvious that in the no
compensation case, the SDD gives a nonuniform proba-
bility distribution when we measure the ANG states in
the OAM spectrum, and nonzero off-diagonal elements
in the ANG spectrum (the fidelity of ANG states shown
in Fig. 5 (c) is 95.1% since the Fresnel number product
is chosen to be 3.96). However, with the WPC proto-
col, an almost uniform probability distribution can be
found when ANG states are measured in OAM basis,
and there are no nonzero off-diagonal elements in the
ANG basis (the fidelity of ANG states in Fig. 5 (d)
is 99.99%). Therefore, the simulation results shows the
ability of WPC protocol to reduce the adverse effects of
SDD.
Prepared and received states
Fig. 6 shows the images of experimentally realized
ANG states after transmitting and receiving apertures
for d = 7, ℓmax = 3. The top row gives the ANG states
with ANG quantum number j from 0 to 3 prepared by the
transmitter. All the states in the top row are prepared
with no compensation while the figures in the bottom row
are the comparison between no compensation and WPC.
Fig. 6 (e) and (f) are prepared and received ANG states
|j = 5〉 with no compensation, and Fig. 6 (g) and (h)
are prepared and received states in the WPC case. After
diffracting in the link, the spatial profile of ANG state
|j = 5〉 in the no compensation case changes greatly, such
that it is intractable to identify the angular position of
the main lobe of the state. However, in the WPC case,
the received ANG state has a similar spatial profile as
the launched state.
Projective measurement
Here, we explain how we experimentally realize the
projective measurement in OAM and ANG bases. For
the OAM states, as the first step, we use SLM2 to ap-
ply diffraction gratings with the same OAM quantum
number as the incident beam onto the SLM2. In this
case, we couple the Gaussian states which are selected
from the first negative diffraction order from SLM2 into
the SMF. Since the negative first diffraction order adds
the opposite phase we added onto the SLM2, in cases
where the OAM quantum number in the incident beam
match the OAM value on the SLM2, the beam in the
first negative order should be a Gaussian. Therefore,
we can record the coupling efficiencies of each incident
OAM state by switch the OAM quantum number in the
diffraction grating. The single mode coupling efficiency
for fundamental Gaussian state is about 40%. All these
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FIG. 6. (a) to (d): Four ANG states generated experimen-
tally with no compensation with Nf = 3.96 at transmitter’s
side. The ANG quantum number of these states is j = 0, 1, 2
and 3 respectively. (e) to (f): the prepared and received ANG
states |j = 5〉 in the no compensation protocol. (g) to (h): the
prepared and received states in the WPC protocol. All images
are taken under identical acquisition parameters. Note that in
panel (f) the dominant lobe of (e) has disappeared, but that
it is retained in (h) through the use of pre-compensation.
calibrations are done with an infinitely large collection
aperture. Then, to do the projective measurement of the
incident beam in the OAM basis, we sequentially imple-
ment the diffraction gratings with different OAM quan-
tum number through the use of SLM2, and then record
the powers coupled into SMF. These powers are divided
by the corresponding coupling efficiencies of each OAM
state to get the exact power of each OAM component in
the incident state before coupling. To get the probabil-
ity distribution we show in the main paper, one needs
to normalize the measured power of each incident OAM
state. In theory, if the incident beam is in an OAM state,
there will be no crosstalk in OAM basis in both conven-
tional protocol and WPC. This is because the grating on
the second SLM only modulates the phase of the incident
beam but not the amplitude. Therefore, the projective
measurement can be described by the following equation:
P (ℓi, ℓm) =∫ R
0
∫ 2π
0
|Ai(r)exp(iℓiθ)exp(−iℓmθ)|2rdrdθ∑ℓmax
ℓm=−ℓmax
∫ R
0
∫ 2π
0
|Ai(r)exp(iℓiθ)exp(−iℓmθ)r|2drdθ
,
(18)
where P (ℓi, ℓm) is probability of finding the OAM ℓm
component in the incident beam which has an OAM equal
to ℓi. Ai(r) is the radial field distribution of the inci-
dent beam. Since the integral over azimuthal degree of
freedom gives a Kronecker delta, Eqn. (18) will finally
reduce to P (ℓi, ℓm) = δℓi,ℓm . Therefore, the radial field
distribution of the incident beam has no influence on the
crosstalk in OAM basis when the incident beam is in
an OAM state. For the ANG states, the measurement
we did is not a complete projective measurement since
10
ANG states have both amplitude and phase information,
but one single SLM can only manipulate one of them.
However, we find out that if we use the same method
as what we use in the OAM basis, we will only get light
coupled into SMF when the ANG quantum added on the
SLM2 matches the ANG quantum number of the incident
beam in the no SDD case. Even though this method pro-
vides a very low coupling efficiency (around 10%), we can
still scan the ANG space and get the crosstalk matrix.
However, when the SDD is taken into consideration, one
can still find some coupling in the SMF when the ANG
quantum numbers mismatch so that we have errors in the
ANG basis (i.e. the errors induced by SDD only). This
gives the off diagonal terms in the crosstalk matrices.
Secure key rate calculation based on experimental
data
The equation (5) in the main paper gives the secure key
density of per photon, while the product of the secure key
density and the transmission efficiency of the states yields
the secure key density per transmitted photon. The se-
cure key rate is then simply the product of the secure key
rate per transmitted photon and the photon rate. From
the experimental data, the measured efficiency for the
ℓ = 3 state is 92.4% which is the transmission efficiency
of WPC using UEL states. The average efficiency of all 7
states is 97.1%, which is the transmission efficiency of the
conventional protocol. Therefore, the secure key density
with WPC can be calculated as 1.63 bits per transmitted
photon, as compared to 0.86 bits per transmitted photon
with no compensation. We can see that a uniform effi-
ciency distribution for all spatial modes, even though it
is low, can provide an improved key rate over maximum
transmission efficiency. Note that there is a discrepancy
in the secure key rate comparison for a Nf = 4 system
between simulation and lab data (Fig. 5). In theory, the
WPC is advantageous only when Nf is small, since for
systems with d = 7 and Nf = 4, the QSER in the ANG
basis is very small (less than 1%). However, in the lab,
due to the imperfect measurements, the QSER in the
ANG basis is much larger than our prediction (average
QSER is 23.6% without compensation, and 8.57% with
compensation). The improvement in the QSER in the
ANG basis leads to the better performance in WPC pro-
tocol, which can improve realistic QKD systems where
the QSER in the ANG basis is always larger than in
OAM basis [7, 24].
